The long and short of the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement by Trefler, Daniel
  
The Long and Short of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
 
Daniel Trefler∗†. 
University of Toronto 
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIAR) 
and 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
 
 
 
 
 
The Toyota Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres 
for Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
       Houghton Street 
EI/41      London WC2A 2AE  
January 2006      Tel:  (020) 7955 6674 
                                                 
∗ Joseph L. Rotman School of Management and Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 105 St. George 
Street, Toronto, ON M5S 3E6. Telephone: (416) 946-7945. E-mail: trefler@chass.utoronto.ca . 
 
†I have benefited from the research assistance of Yijun Jiang, Huiwen Lai, Runjuan Liu, and Susan Zhu. Michael 
Baker, Erwin Diewert, Peter Dungan, Gerry Helleiner, Pravin Krishna, Aloysius Siow and members of the Canadian 
Institute for Advanced Research (CIAR) provided key comments that dramatically improved the paper. Much more 
than is usually the case, this paper was dramatically overhauled in response to the creative input from two anonymous 
referees. Many members of Statistics Canada provided advice on data issues including Richard Barnabé (Standards 
Division), Jocelyne Elibani (International Trade Division), Richard Landry (Investment and Capital Stock Division), 
Jean-Pierre Maynard (Productivity Division), Bruno Pepin (Industry Division), and Bob Traversy (Industry Division). I 
am especially grateful to John 
Baldwin (Director, Micro-Economic Studies and Analysis Division) for making available the  plant-level data. Alla 
Lileeva was kind enough to analyse the plant-level data in Ottawa. Research support from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) is gratefully acknowledged. Views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect those of Statistics Canada or SSHRC. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) provides a unique window 
onto the effects of a reciprocal trade agreement on an industrialized 
economy (Canada). For industries that experienced the deepest Canadian 
tariff cuts, employment fell by 12 percent and labour productivity rose by 15 
percent as low-productivity plants contracted. For industries that received 
the largest U.S. tariff cuts, there were no employment gains, but plant-level 
labour productivity soared by 14 percent. These results highlight the conflict 
between those who bore the short-run adjustment costs (displaced workers 
and struggling plants) and those who are garnering the long-run gains 
(consumers and efficient plants). Finally, a simple welfare analysis provides 
evidence of aggregate welfare gains. 
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The central tenet of international economics is that free trade is welfare improving. We
express our conviction about free trade in our textbooks and we sell it to our politicians.
Yet the fact of the matter is that we have one heck of a time explaining these benefits to
the larger public, a public gripped by Free Trade Fatigue.
Why is the message of professional economists not more persuasive? To my mind there
are two reasons. First, in examining trade liberalization we treat short-run transition costs
and long-run eﬃciency gains as entirely separate areas of inquiry. On the one hand are
those who study the long-run productivity benefits of free trade policies e.g., Tybout et
al. (1991), Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Tybout and Westbrook (1995), Krishna and
Mitra (1998), Head and Ries (1999b), and Pavcnik (2002). On the other hand are those
who study the impacts of freer trade on short-run worker displacement and earnings e.g.,
Gaston and Trefler (1994, 1995), Revenga (1997), Levinsohn (1999), Beaulieu (2000), and
Krishna et al. (2001). Only Currie and Harrison’s (1997) study of Morocco examines both
labour market outcomes and productivity. In assessing free trade policies there is clearly a
bias introduced when looking only at the long-run benefits or only at the short-run costs.
Nowhere is this more apparent than for the Canadian experience with the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and its extension to Mexico. The FTA triggered on-going and
heated debates about freer trade. This heat was generated by the conflict between those who
bore the short run adjustment costs (displaced workers and stakeholders of closed plants)
and those who garnered the long run eﬃciency gains (stakeholders of competitive plants
and users of final and intermediate goods).
There is another reason why the free trade message is not more persuasive. While case-
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study evidence abounds about eﬃciency gains from liberalization (e.g., Krueger 1997), solid
econometric evidence for industrialized countries remains scarce. When I teach my students
about the eﬀects of free trade on productivity I turn to high-quality studies for Chile (Tybout
et al. 1991; Pavcnik 2002), Turkey (Levinsohn 1993), Cote d’Ivoire (Harrison 1994), Mexico
(Tybout and Westbrook 1995), and India (Krishna and Mitra 1998) among others. Even
though I find these studies compelling, I wonder whether they can be expected to persuade
policy makers and voters in industrialized countries such as Canada and the United States.
What is needed is at least some research focussing on industrialized countries.
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement oﬀers several advantages for assessing the short-
run costs and long-run benefits of trade liberalization in an industrialized country. First,
the FTA policy experiment is clearly defined. In developing countries, trade liberalization
is typically part of a larger package of market reforms, making it diﬃcult to isolate the
role of trade policy. Further, the market reforms themselves are often initiated in response
to major macroeconomic disturbances. Macroeconomic shocks, market reforms, and trade
liberalization are confounded. Indeed, Helleiner (1994, page 28) uses this fact to argue that
“Empirical research on the relationship between total factor productivity (TFP) growth and
... the trade regime has been inconclusive.” His view is widely shared e.g., Harrison and
Hanson (1999) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999). In contrast, the FTAwas not implemented
as part of a larger package of reforms or as a response to a macroeconomic crisis. Second, as
Harrison and Revenga (1995, page 1) note, “Trade policy is almost never measured using the
most obvious indicators — such as tariﬀs.” Tybout (2000) echoes this criticism. My study
of the FTA is particularly careful about constructing pure policy-mandated tariﬀ measures.
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Third, the FTA is not just about import-liberalizing policies. It is a reciprocal agreement
that includes export-liberalizing policies as well. It should therefore be expected to induce
a pronounced general equilibrium relocation of resources out of import-competing sectors
and into export-oriented sectors. I will examine these FTA eﬀects on a large number of
Canadian plant and industry outcomes. At the plant and industry levels the outcomes
include employment and earnings of both production and non-production workers, skill
upgrading, earnings inequality, hours of work, plant size, and labour productivity. At the
industry level the outcomes include the number of plants, investment in human capital,
imports, exports, trade diversion, and intra-industry trade.
Fourth, the FTA is a preferential trading arrangement. Such arrangements need not be
welfare improving. I will examine the two conditions usually put forward as suﬃcient —
at least informally — for welfare gains. These are that trade creation must dominate trade
diversion and that import prices must not rise (Krishna 2003; Panagariya 2000). Both
conditions are satisfied.
The backdrop of the FTA — an industrialized country, a clean policy experiment, the
direct policy lever of tariﬀs, general equilibrium reciprocity eﬀects, and the long list of
outcomes including employment, productivity and prices — will be my basis for a rigourous
and detailed examination of the short-run costs and long-run benefits of trade liberalization.
The FTA has been the subject of several studies since its implementation on January
1, 1989. Gaston and Trefler (1997) found that the FTA had no eﬀect on earnings and only
a modest eﬀect on employment. Beaulieu (2000) found that the employment eﬀect was
primarily driven by modest non-production worker employment losses. Claussing (2001)
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found evidence that the FTA raised U.S. imports from Canada (trade creation), but did not
divert U.S. imports away from other U.S. trading partners. The most intriguing FTA study
is by Head and Ries (1999b). They found that the FTA had little net eﬀect on industry-level
average output per plant (which they take as a proxy for scale) and a puzzling eﬀect on
Canadian plant exit (exit was induced by falling Canadian tariﬀs and by falling U.S. tariﬀs).
Unfortunately, none of these papers use plant-level data. Further, I will argue below that at
least some of these papers (including my own), suﬀer specification issues that substantively
mar the inferences drawn about the eﬀects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
1. The FTA Tariﬀ Cuts: Too Small to Matter?
This paper deals with the impact of FTA-mandated tariﬀ cuts. The top panel of figure
1 plots Canada’s average manufacturing tariﬀ against the United States (solid line) and
Canada’s average manufacturing tariﬀ against the rest of the world (dashed line). The
bottom panel plots the corresponding U.S. tariﬀs against Canada (solid line) and the rest
of the world (dashed line). In 1988, the average Canadian tariﬀ rate against the United
States was 8.1 percent. The corresponding eﬀective tariﬀ rate was 16 percent.1 Perhaps
most importantly, tariﬀs in excess of 10 percent sheltered one in four Canadian industries.
Given that these industries were almost all characterized by low wages, low capital-labour
ratios, and low profit margins, the 1988 tariﬀ wall was indeed high. Similar comments apply
to the U.S. tariﬀ against Canada, albeit with less force since the average 1988 U.S. tariﬀ
1Both the nominal and eﬀective tariﬀ rates were aggregated up from the 4-digit SIC level using Canadian
production weights. The standard formula used to calculate the eﬀective rate of protection appears in Trefler
(2001, page 39). Details about construction of the tariﬀ series appear in Appendix A.
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was 4 percent.
That one in four Canadian industries had tariﬀs in excess of 10 percent depends crucially
on the level of aggregation. I am working with 4-digit Canadian SIC data (213 industries). If
one aggregates up even to 3-digit data (105 industries), almost no industries had 1988 tariﬀs
in excess of 10 percent. This is important because studies of trade liberalization typically
do not work with comparably disaggregated tariﬀ data. For example, papers by Tybout et
al. (1991), Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Tybout and Westbrook (1995), Gaston and
Trefler (1997), Krishna and Mitra (1998), and Beaulieu (2000) are never at a finer level of
aggregation than 3-digit ISIC with its 28 manufacturing sectors.
The core feature of the FTA is that it reduced tariﬀs between Canada and the United
States without reducing tariﬀs against the rest of the world. Graphically, the FTA placed
a gap between the dashed and solid lines of figure 1. Letting i index industries and t index
years, my measures of the FTA policy levers will be
τCAit : the FTA-mandated Canadian tariﬀ concessions granted to the United States. In terms
of the top panel of figure 1, this is the solid line minus the dashed line.
τUSit : the FTA-mandated U.S. tariﬀ concessions granted to Canada. In terms of the bottom
panel of figure 1, this is the solid line minus the dashed line.
τCAit and τ
US
it capture the core textual aspects of the FTA.
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2Given that tariﬀs are positively correlated with eﬀective tariﬀs and nontariﬀ barriers to trade (NTBs),
the coeﬃcients on τCAit and τ
US
it will capture the eﬀects of FTA-mandated reductions in tariﬀs, eﬀective
tariﬀs, and nontariﬀ barriers. This is exactly what I want: When analysing tariﬀ concessions I am actually
capturing a broader set of FTA trade-liberalizing policies.
5
2. Econometric Strategy
In this section, I lay out econometric strategies for analysing the plant- and industry-level
data. I begin with the latter. Let i index industries, let t index years, and let Yit be a
Canadian outcome of interest such as employment or productivity. The FTA mandates that
tariﬀs be reduced once a year on January 1, starting in 1989. I have data for the FTA
period 1989-96. In what follows I will define the pre-FTA period as the years 1980-86. As
will be shown in detail, this choice is useful for dealing with business fluctuations. Let ∆yis
be the average annual log change in Yit over period s where s = 1 indexes the FTA period
and s = 0 indexes the pre-FTA period. That is,
∆yis ≡
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(lnYi,1996 − lnYi,1988)/(1996− 1988) for s = 1
(lnYi,1986 − lnYi,1980)/(1986− 1980) for s = 0
. (1)
The FTA period changes use 1988 data because I am interested in comparing the FTA-
period outcome Yi,1996 with its baseline level i.e., with its level before the first round of tariﬀ
reductions on January 1, 1989.3 For k = CA and k = US, define
∆τki1 ≡ (τki,1996 − τki,1988)/(1996− 1988). (2)
∆τCAi1 measures the change in the FTA-mandated tariﬀ concessions extended by Canada
to the United States. Likewise, ∆τUSi1 measures the change in the FTA-mandated tariﬀ
3Since this may cause confusion, consider by analogy a cholesterol-reducing drug trial in which the drug
is given once a year on January 1 (starting in 1989) and the patient’s cholesterol level Yit is measured
once a year on December 31 (starting in 1988). To measure the long term eﬀects of the drug one looks at
Yi,1996−Yi,1988 rather than Yi,1996−Yi,1989 because Yi,1988 describes the patient cholesterol baseline without
drugs. The same logic holds for the ‘drug of free trade.’ The FTA mandates that tariﬀs be reduced once
a year on January 1 (starting in 1989) and the plants are surveyed once a year as closely as possible to
December 31. Therefore, the appropriate baseline is Yi,1988.
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concessions extended by the United States to Canada.
What of pre-FTA period tariﬀ concessions, which I denote by ∆τki0? Except for the 1965
Canada-U.S. Auto Pact, all tariﬀ rates were extended on a Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
basis prior to 1988. Thus, define ∆τki0 ≡ (τki,1986 − τki,1980)/(1986 − 1980) when industry i
is in the automotive sector and ∆τki0 = 0 otherwise. As will be shown, setting ∆τki0 = 0
for all i or omitting the automotive sector entirely from the analysis makes no diﬀerence to
the results. Additional details about ∆τki1, including a list of industries with large absolute
values of ∆τCAi1 and ∆τUSi1 , appear in appendix A.
I am interested in a regression model explaining the impact of the FTA-mandated tariﬀ
concessions on a variety of industry outcomes:
∆yis = θs + βCA∆τCAis + βUS∆τUSis + εis, s = 0, 1 (3)
where θs is a period fixed eﬀect. There is an obvious problem with estimating equation
(3). I have no deeply satisfying way of controlling for the lack of randomization in the tariﬀ
concessions. I must thus take particular care to control both for the endogeneity of tariﬀs
and for sources of industry-level heterogeneity that might contaminate the estimates of βCA
and βUS. I turn to this task now.
2.1. The Secular Growth Control
For political economy reasons, one might expect declining industries to have high tariﬀs and
hence deep FTA tariﬀ concessions e.g., Trefler (1993). To prevent mistakenly attributing
secular growth trends to the FTA tariﬀ concessions, I introduce a growth fixed eﬀect αi into
equation (3):
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∆yis = αi + θs + βCA∆τCAis + βUS∆τUSis + εis, s = 0, 1. (4)
As a result, βCA and βUS only pick up FTA impacts on industry growth that are departures
from industry trend growth.
2.2. Industry-Specific Shocks
A number of Canadian industries experienced reversals of fortune in the sense that em-
ployment growth in the pre-FTA and FTA periods had opposite signs. For these industries
similar reversals also appeared in their U.S. counterparts. This is indicative of industry-
specific demand and supply shocks. If these reversals of fortune are a characteristic of
highly protected industries, the reversals might contaminate the estimates of βCA and βUS.
Controlling for reversals of fortune begins with the observation that many industry-specific
shocks that appeared in Canada also appeared in Canada’s major trading partners. For
example, higher oil prices eﬀected the petroleum industry in Canada and all its major trad-
ing partners. I have industry-level data for Canada’s 3 largest trading partners: the United
States, Japan, and the United Kingdom. I use these data to control for industry-specific
shocks.
More formally, let ∆yjis be data on ∆yis for economy j e.g., if ∆yis is Canadian employ-
ment growth then ∆yjis is country j’s employment growth. I control for industry-specific
shocks by including ∆yjis in equation (4). Note that it is unlikely that ∆yjis is exogenous, es-
pecially for j = US, so I will have to employ instrumental variables (IV) techniques. Finally,
for expositional ease I will refer to ∆yjis as the ‘U.S. control’ and simply write ∆yUSis .
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2.3. The Business Conditions Control
A key issue for examining the FTA is the treatment of the early 1990s recession. Figure 2
plots GDP in year t (gdpt) for Canadian manufacturing. The data are in logs relative to a
1980 base i.e., ln(gdpt/gdp1980). The FTA period recession stands out. This is a problem if
the industries that experienced the deepest tariﬀ concessions share a common sensitivity to
changes in business conditions. General business conditions can be introduced into equation
(4) by including a regressor∆bis that captures howmovements in GDP and the real exchange
rate aﬀect industry i. I will explain how ∆bis is constructed shortly. Introducing ∆bis and
∆yUSis into equation (4) yields
∆yis = αi + θs + βCA∆τCAis + βUS∆τUSis + γ∆yUSis + δ∆bis + εis, s = 0, 1. (5)
2.4. Estimation
Diﬀerencing (5) across periods yields my diﬀerence-of-diﬀerences baseline specification:
(∆yi1 −∆yi0) = θ + βCA(∆τCAi1 −∆τCAi0 ) + βUS(∆τUSi1 −∆τUSi0 )
+ γ(∆yUSi1 −∆yUSi0 ) + δ(∆bi1 −∆bi0) + υi (6)
where θ ≡ θ1 − θ0. This specification controls for secular industry trends (by diﬀerencing
out the αi), industry-specific demand and supply shocks (the ∆yUSis ), and industry-specific
business condition eﬀects (the ∆bis). Clearly, I will have to use an IV estimator to deal with
the endogeneity of the tariﬀ concessions and ∆yUSi1 −∆yUSi0 .
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It is important to note that the use of long double-diﬀerencing means that I need not
worry about dynamic panel estimation problems (Arellano and Honoré, 2001). This is im-
portant because all previous FTA studies have used annual data without any correction for
autocorrelation i.e., Gaston and Trefler (1997), Head and Ries (1999a,b), Beaulieu (2000),
and Claussing (2001). Yet the fact is that employment and output display strong autocor-
relation at lags of up to 3 years. For example, Canadian employment displays significant
3-year autocorrelation in 31 percent of all industries and 1-year autocorrelation in an over-
whelming 77 percent of all industries. Thus, the estimators used in all previous studies of
the FTA (including my own) are inconsistent and yield standard errors that are too small.
2.5. Plant-Level Data
Letting k index plants, my baseline plant-level specification is
(∆yik1 −∆yik0) = θ + βCA(∆τCAi1 −∆τCAi0 ) + βUS(∆τUSi1 −∆τUSi0 ) + φxik,1980
+ γ(∆yUSi1 −∆yUSi0 ) + δ(∆bi1 −∆bi0) + υik (7)
where ∆yiks is the change in the outcome of interest for plant k in industry i in period s and
xik,1980 is a vector of plant characteristics that includes the log of 1980 employment, the log
of 1980 earnings per worker, the log of 1980 labour productivity, and the log of plant age.
Since the plant data only go back to 1973, I also include a dummy for whether the plant
was older than 7 years of age in 1980. There are 3,801 plants in the sample.4
4I am indebted to Alla Lileeva for running these regressions and for sharing her experience as to which
plant-level controls to use. Without her, the plant-level analysis would not have been possible.
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There are two selection issues that require attention. First, equation (7) only makes use
of plants that were in existence in 1980, 1986, 1988, and 1996. Obviously these ‘continuing’
plants are not representative of all plants. Unfortunately, I have not been able to make even
simple corrections for entry and exit because the database available to me cannot be used
in any simple way to track entry and exit. (Unlike the U.S. longitudinal plant database, the
Canadian database has not attracted as many resources for data ‘cleaning’ and data access.)
Second, I will be working with what are known as ‘long-form’ plants, that is, plants that
fill out a detailed survey. In 1988, long-form plants were 2.2 times larger than ‘short-form’
plants. Thus, my plant-level results must be understood as dealing with larger plants. This
said, appendix E provides some evidence that my results apply to small plants as well.5
3. The Data
Canadian data are from the Canadian Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), the Canadian
Labour Force Survey, the International Trade Division, the Input-Output Division, the Prices
Division, and the Standards Division (for commodity and industry concordances). Almost
all the data used involved special tabulations by Statistics Canada. Most of the U.S. data
through 1994 are from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database (Bartelsman and
Gray, 1996) and Feenstra (1996). I updated these sources to 1996. As discussed in Trefler
(2001, page 11), I have been especially careful to build a Canada-U.S. converter that steps
down from over 1,000 U.S. products to 213 Canadian industries.
5One final thought on the estimating equation. This paper is unabashedly a reduced-form exercise that
allows the inferences to be driven more by the data than by a highly structured model. This has obvious
advantages, but it also has a cost. A more structured approach, as in Head and Ries (2001) or Lai and
Trefler (2002), muzzles the data, but allows for a clearer interpretation of the coeﬃcients and for a richer
treatment of general equilibrium feedbacks.
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4. Empirical Results: Employment
Table 1 reports estimates of equations (6) and (7) for the case where the dependent variable
is employment growth. The table includes a large number of specifications in order to show
that the estimates of βCA and βUS are not particularly sensitive to the choice of specification.
Row 1 is my industry-level baseline specification. It uses ordinary least squares (OLS) and
includes all 4 regressors. I will explain coeﬃcient magnitudes shortly, but for now treat bβCA
and bβUS as the log-point changes in employment associated with the FTA. For example, the
Canadian tariﬀ concessions led to a −.12 log-point change in employment (t = −2.35).
The first specification issue handled by table 1 deals with the sensitivity of bβCA and bβUS
to the way in which the business conditions variable ∆bis is constructed. In order to explain
how ∆bis is constructed, define zt ≡ (ln gdpt, ln rert) where rert is the real exchange rate
and let ∆1 be the annual diﬀerence operator so that ∆1zt = zt−zt−1 and ∆1yit = yit−yi,t−1.
To construct ∆bis, I first regressed ∆1yit on (∆1zt, . . . ,∆1zt−J) for some lag length J . This
is a time-series regression that was estimated separately for each i. The regression generates
an industry-specific prediction d∆1yit of the eﬀect of current and past business conditions
on current annual employment growth. Second, note from equation (1) that ∆yi1 can be
written as Σ1996t=1989∆1yit/8. This motivates the definition of ∆bi1 as ∆bi1 ≡ Σ1996t=1989 d∆1yit/8.
∆bi1 is just an industry-specific prediction of the eﬀect of business conditions on FTA-period
employment growth. For the pre-FTA period I use ∆bi0 ≡ Σ1986t=1981 d∆1yit/6. Note that there
is a diﬀerent ∆bis for each outcome. For example, when ∆yis is earnings growth then ∆bis
is the portion of industry i earnings growth driven by movements in GDP and the real
exchange rate. See appendix C for further details.
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Row 1 of table 1 uses my baseline specification of ∆bis in which the lag length is J = 2.
I chose J = 2 because the industry-specific autocorrelation functions only vanish at longer
lags. Row 2 of table 1, which uses J = 0, illustrates that bβCA and bβUS are not sensitive to
the choice of lag length. Row 3 uses J = 2, but drops the real exchange rate (rert) from zt.
This does not dramatically alter the estimates either. In fact, as row 4 shows, the estimates
rise only slightly when ∆bi1 −∆bi0 is omitted from the baseline specification. This requires
some explanation as it might be misinterpreted to mean that business conditions are playing
only a minor role.
Returning to figure 2, the 1980-86 and 1988-96 periods are very similar in terms of
business conditions. Each began a year before the peak, each entered a deep recession
in the third year, and each ended in the midst of a prolonged expansion. Further, my
decision to end the pre-FTA period in 1986 ensures that the two periods are similar as
judged by GDP growth over the period and by the number of years into the expansion.
That is, I have purposely chosen the pre-FTA period so that, after double-diﬀerencing, my
estimating equations have a built-in, implicit control for business conditions. This explains
why omitting ∆bi1−∆bi0 does not dramatically alter the results. Also note that the results
are similar with the pre-FTA period defined as 1980-88 or the FTA period defined as 1988-94.
See appendix table A2.
Finally, ∆bi1 − ∆bi0 is a generated regressor which means that some care is needed to
ensure correct standard errors. Fortunately, it is straightforward to show that my reported
OLS standard errors come from the same distribution as the asymptotically ‘true’ (i.e.,
√
N-
limiting) distribution. This can be shown by verifying that condition (6.3) on page 116 of
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Wooldridge (2002) is satisfied. Further specification tests are discussed in appendix C.
Consider now the U.S. control variable ∆yUSi1 −∆yUSi0 . Its coeﬃcient is positive for all
results reported in this paper. This is to be expected if it is picking up demand and supply
shocks that are common to both U.S. and Canadian industries. Row 5 replaces∆yUSi1 −∆yUSi0
with (∆yJapani1 +∆yUKi1 )/2− (∆y
Japan
i0 +∆yUKi0 )/2. Comparison of row 5 with row 1 reveals
that this makes little diﬀerence to bβCA or bβUS. Row 6 shows that the omission of the U.S.
control also makes little diﬀerence. Clearly, bβCA and bβUS are not sensitive to how the U.S.
control is modelled. This conclusion will continue to hold when I endogenize the U.S. control
in row 13.6
Row 7 shows that omission of both the U.S. control and the business conditions control
has no eﬀect on bβUS, but does raise bβCA from −0.12 to −0.17. I conclude from rows 1-7
that my row 1 baseline estimates are not sensitive to the exact treatment of industry-specific
shocks (the U.S. control) or the business conditions control provided that at least one of
them is included in the specification. This conclusion holds true for all the statistically
significant estimates reported in this paper.
Rows 8 and 9 examine the role of particular observations. As appendix table A1 shows,
the Brewery and Shipbuilding industries have unusually large Canadian tariﬀ concessions
and are thus potentially influential observations. In row 8, I delete these observations. This
6Throughout this paper I will use U.S. data rather than Japan-U.K. data. The disadvantage of using
∆yUSis is that the Canadian tariﬀ concessions likely raised U.S. employment at the expense of Canadian
employment. However, if this were an important feature of the data then I would expect the correlation
between ∆yUSi1 and ∆yi1 to be negative (in fact it is a strongly positive 0.50) and the coeﬃcient on (∆yUSi1 −
∆yUSi0 ) to be negative (in fact, it also is strongly positive). The disadvantage of (∆y
Japan
is + ∆yUKis )/2 is
that these data are only available at the 3-digit ISIC level (28 industries). This means that I must concord
data on 28 industries into data on 213 4-digit Canadian SIC industries. The result is noisy data. I thus
prefer using U.S. data. Clearly, however, it does not matter which I use. Finally, the Japanese and U.K.
data are from the UNIDO database.
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slightly raises bβCA. In row 9, I delete the 9 industries in the automotive sector. This raises
bβUS, but not significantly.
Row 10 is my baseline plant-level specification. It includes the plant-level controls i.e.,
plant age and the 1980 values of the log of employment, the log of earnings, and the log of
labour productivity. Notice that the plant-level estimate of βCA and βUS are almost iden-
tical to the industry-level estimates of row 1. This suggests that, at least for employment,
the industry-level regressions are capturing within-plant eﬀects rather than between-plant
eﬀects.7
The U.S. tariﬀ concessions had no eﬀect on employment at the plant level, but modestly
reduced employment at the industry level. This means that the U.S. tariﬀ concessions must
have forced more labour-intensive plants to contract. My student Alla Lileeva has refined
this observation by showing that the plant-level result reflects the eﬀect of pooling across
exporters (for which βUS > 0) and non-exporters (for which βUS < 0). She has linked the
Canadian plant-level data to data on the exporter status of the plant. While the match
precludes using my diﬀerence-of-diﬀerences methodology, she has nevertheless been able
to show that bβUS is positive for exporters and hugely negative for non-exporters. Why?
The U.S. tariﬀ concessions had the unexpected eﬀect of encouraging Canadian exporters
to expand their domestic operations at the expense of Canadian non-exporters. Since the
majority of plants are non-exporters, pooling across exporters and non-exporters yields
7If this is not clear consider the following. Let xikt be some characteristic of plant k in industry i in year
t, let sikt be plant k’s market share and let xit ≡ Σkxiktsikt be the average value of xikt. Using obvious
diﬀerence notation, ∆xit = Σi∆xiktsikt +Σi∆siktxik,t−1 i.e., the total industry change can be decomposed
into a within-plant change (the first term) and a between-plant or market-share shift change (the second
term). The plant level regressions deal with∆xikt and thus capture within-plant changes. The industry-level
regressions deal with ∆xit and thus capture both within-plant and market-share shift changes.
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estimates of βUS that are close to 0.
Returning to the plant-level estimates in table 1, row 11 excludes the plant-level controls.
Comparison with row 10 shows that bβCA or bβUS are unaﬀected by the exclusion of the plant-
level controls.
Rows 12-15 report the IV results. A key issue is the identification of variables that satisfy
the two requirements of an instrument. The most likely candidates for valid instruments
are variables measuring the level of industry characteristics in 1980. For one, these level
characteristics are unlikely to be correlated with the residuals because the latter are twice-
diﬀerenced. Such diﬀerence of diﬀerences are far removed from levels. For another, the
1980 characteristics determine the 1980 levels of protection which in turn are correlated
with the tariﬀ changes. I therefore use an instrument set that consists of 1980 log values
for: (1) Canadian hourly wages, which captures protection for low-wage industries as in
Corden’s (1974) conservative social welfare function, (2) the level of employment, which
captures protection for large industries as in Finger et al.’s (1982) high-track protection for
large industries, (3) Canadian imports from the United States, and (4) U.S. imports from
Canada. I also include squares and cross—products as well as any exogenous regressors. The
first-stage R2s are between 0.30 and 0.40 for almost all the results in this paper.
Row 12 repeats the specification of row 1, but with the two tariﬀ regressors instrumented.
bβCA and bβUS are now much larger. Also, bβUS reverses signs, suggesting that the U.S. tariﬀ
concessions raised Canadian employment. However, these results do not pass the Hausman
test.
The ‘OverId/Hausman’ column reports p-values for over-identification and Hausman
16
tests. In row 12, both the over-identification test (0.60) and the Hausman test (0.65) are
above 0.01 which indicates that the instruments are valid at the 1 percent level and that
endogeneity is rejected at the 1 percent level. Given the poor small-sample properties of IV
estimators (Nelson and Startz, 1990), I use the 1 percent cut-oﬀ i.e., p-values below 0.01.
Row 13 reports the IV estimates for the case where the U.S. control is instrumented along
with the two tariﬀ concessions. Comparing row 13 with row 12, it is clear that endogenizing
the U.S. control has no impact on the estimates of bβCA and bβUS. Further, endogeneity
continues to be rejected.8
Rows 14 and 15 repeat the IV exercises of rows 12 and 13, respectively, but starting with
the plant-level baseline specification of row 10. As with the industry-level results, the bβCA
and bβUS are much larger, but endogeneity is rejected. Indeed, endogeneity is easily rejected
for every plant-level specification reported in this paper. This likely reflects the fact that
tariﬀs, even if endogenous to the industry, are exogenous to the plant.
5. Coeﬃcient Magnitudes
I have not yet properly explained the magnitudes of bβCA and bβUS. Since the distribution
of tariﬀ concessions is skewed, it is of interest to know the eﬀect of the Canadian tariﬀ
concessions on themost-impacted, import-competing group of industries i.e., on the one-third
of industries with the most negative values of ∆τCAi1 . This group has 71 (=213/3) industries,
8As someone who has tried to build a career on the endogeneity of protection (Trefler, 1993), I am
surprised by the rejection of endogeneity. To investigate further, I have experimented with a much larger
set of instruments drawn from 1980 and 1988 characteristics of Canadian and U.S. industries. I have also
experimented with a drastically reduced instrument. None of this makes any diﬀerence to the conclusion
that endogeneity is rejected. As a result, I will report the industry-level IV results, but downplay them.
Interestingly, endogeneity only comes into play when the dependent variable is imports.
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tariﬀ concessions ranging from −5 to −33 percent, and an average tariﬀ concession of −10
percent. The industries are listed in appendix table A1. For any industry i, the Canadian
tariﬀ concessions are estimated to change employment by bβCA∆τCAi1 log points. For the
most-impacted, import-competing group as a whole this change is given by bβCA∆τCA·1 where
∆τCA·1 is a weighted average of the ∆τCAi1 with weights that depend on industry size. (See
appendix B for details about the weights.) It is bβCA∆τCA·1 that is reported in the βCA column
of all the tables in this paper. From row 1 of table 1, the most-impacted, import-competing
group as a whole experienced a 12 percent employment loss.
A similar discussion of coeﬃcient magnitudes applies to the most-impacted, export-
oriented group of industries i.e., the one-third of industries (71 industries) with the most
negative values of ∆τUSi1 . For this group the estimated impact of the U.S. tariﬀ concessions
on employment is given by bβUS∆τUS·1 where ∆τUS·1 is the weighted average of the ∆τUSi1 .
bβUS∆τUS·1 is reported in the βUS column of all the tables in this paper. From row 1 of table
1, this group experienced a statistically insignificant and non-robust 3 percent employment
loss.
The ‘Total FTA Impact’ columns in this paper present the joint eﬀect of the tariﬀ
concessions on manufacturing employment as a whole. This eﬀect is just
TFI ≡ bβCA∆τCA·1 + bβUS∆τUS·1 (8)
where∆τCA·1 and∆τ
US
·1 are now defined as averages across all 213 industries. From the ‘TFI’
column of row 1 in table 1, the FTA reduced manufacturing employment by 5 percent. This
impact is statistically significant and quite similar across all the OLS specifications. It
stands in sharp contrast to Gaston and Trefler (1997) who found economically small and
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statistically insignificant eﬀects of the FTA. The diﬀerence in conclusions reflects both the
better data and the better methodology of the current study.
Employment losses of 5 percent translate into 100,000 lost jobs and strike me as large, not
least because only a relatively small number of industries experienced deep tariﬀ concessions.
Indeed, most of these lost jobs were concentrated in the most-impacted, import-competing
industries. For this group, with its 12 percent job losses, one in eight jobs disappeared. This
number points to the very large transition costs of moving out of low-end, heavily protected
industries. It reflects the most obvious of the costs associated with trade liberalization.
It is diﬃcult to be sure whether these transition costs were short-run in nature. However,
two facts drawn from the most recent seasonally adjusted data suggest that they probably
were short run costs. First, the FTA had no long-run eﬀect on the Canadian employment rate
which was 62 percent both in April 1988 and April 2002. Second, Canadian manufacturing
employment has been more robust than in most OECD countries. For example, between
April 1988 and April 2002, manufacturing employment rose by 9.1 percent in Canada, but
fell by 12.9 percent in the United States and by 9.7 percent in Japan. This suggests, albeit
not conclusively, that the transition costs were short run in the sense that within 10 years
the lost employment was made up for by employment gains in other parts of manufacturing.
6. Labour Productivity
It would be best to examine productivity using a total factor productivity (TFP) measure.
Unfortunately, the Canadian ASM does not record capital stock or investment data. There
is thus little alternative but to work with labour productivity. I define labour productivity
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as value added in production activities per hour worked by production workers.9 I deflate
using 3-digit SIC output deflators.10 Table 2 reports the labour productivity results. The
table has the exact same format as the table 1 employment results so that I can review it
quickly. As in the table 1, endogeneity is always rejected11 and all the industry-level OLS
results are similar so that I can focus on the baseline row 1 specification.
From the industry-level OLS results, the Canadian tariﬀ concessions raised labour pro-
ductivity by 15 percent in the most-impacted, import-competing group of industries (t =
3.11). This translates into an enormous compound annual growth rate of 1.9 percent. The
fact that the eﬀect is smaller and statistically insignificant at the plant level (row 10) suggests
that much of the productivity gain is coming from market share shifts favouring high pro-
ductivity plants. Such share shifting would come about from the growth of high-productivity
plants and the demise and/or exit of low-productivity plants.
From the plant-level OLS results (row 10), the U.S. tariﬀ concessions raised labour
productivity by 14 percent or 1.9 percent annually in the most-impacted, export-oriented
group of industries (t = 3.97). This labour productivity gain does not appear at the industry
level (bβUS = 0.04, t = 1.14) which is likely due to the fact that the U.S. tariﬀ concessions
encouraged entry of plants that are less productive by virtue of being young. (On the low
9Trefler (2001) extensively examined the sensitivity of results to alternative definitions of labour pro-
ductivity. Appendix D of the current paper shows that the results are not sensitive to redefining labour
productivity as total value added (in both production and non-production activities) per worker (both pro-
duction and non-production workers). This definition does not correct for hours; however, it is useful in
that it is directly comparable to the way in which I am forced to define U.S. labour productivity in ∆yUSis .
(The U.S. ASM does not report value added in production activities.)
10Appendix D also shows that the results do not change when labour productivity is deflated by the
available 2-digit SIC value-added deflators. I am indebted to Alwyn Young for encouraging me to carefully
examine the issue of deflators.
11The table 2 IV results are based on an instrument set without squares or cross-products because these
are rejected by the over-identification tests.
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productivity of young plants see Baldwin 1995 for Canada and Bernard and Jensen 1995 for
the United States.) The importance of controlling for plant age can be seen by comparing
rows 10 and 11 since the latter excludes the plant age control and has a lower bβUS.12
The last column of table 2 looks at the total FTA impact on all of manufacturing. The
plant-level numbers of row 10 indicate that the FTA raised labour productivity in manu-
facturing by 7.4 percent or by an annual compound growth rate of 0.93 percent (t = 4.92).
The industry-level numbers are about the same. These numbers, along with the 14-15 per-
cent eﬀects for the most-impacted importers and exporters, are enormous. The idea that
an international trade policy could raise labour productivity so dramatically is to my mind
remarkable.
7. Import Prices and Trade Creation/Diversion: Implications for
Welfare
Preferential trade arrangements, including the FTA, need not be welfare improving. The
literature identifies two conditions which, if satisfied, increase the likelihood of aggregate
welfare gains for a representative agent. These are that trade creation ‘dominates’ trade
diversion and that import prices do not rise (Krishna 2003, Panagariya 2000). This section
explores these conditions.
12Another contributing factor to the diﬀerence between the bβUS at the industry and plant levels is that
the U.S. tariﬀ concessions encouraged Canadian plants to enter the U.S. market. This must reduce average
productivity because new Canadian exporters are less productive than old Canadian exporters (Baldwin
and Gu 2001). (This is not true of U.S. exporters. See Bernard and Jensen 1999.) Expansion into the
U.S. market therefore increases the market share of lower productivity new exporters, thus reducing the
industry-level productivity eﬀect.
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7.1. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
Krishna (2003) oﬀers a precise expression for welfare gains in terms of the relative sizes
of trade creation and diversion. Let ∆ lnmisj be the log change in Canadian imports of
industry i in period s from region j = US or j = ROW (rest of the world). Let ∆τ isj be
the corresponding change in the Canadian tariﬀ. Krishna shows that a suﬃcient condition
for welfare gains is
−0.8∆ lnmi1US∆τ i1US
− 0.2∆ lnmi1ROW∆τ i1US
> 0 (9)
where 0.8 is the share of Canadian imports originating from the United States. The first term
is a utility-relevant measure of trade creation and is positive because∆ lnmi1US/∆τ i1US < 0.
The second term is a utility-relevant measure of trade diversion and is likely negative because
∆ lnmi1ROW/∆τ i1US is likely positive.13
I examine equation (9) empirically as follows. The first row in table 3 reports estimates of
my standard equation (6) using Canadian imports from the United States as the dependent
variable. Note that there is no U.S. control in this regression because it makes no sense
in an import context. The Canadian tariﬀ concessions raised Canadian imports from the
United States by 54 percent. I therefore set ∆ lnmi1US/∆τ i1US equal to −0.54. The third
row in table 3 reports my estimates of equation (6) using Canadian imports from the rest
of the world as the dependent variable. The Canadian tariﬀ concessions lowered Canadian
13Krishna’s analysis looks at a representative consumer in an economy with a single final good. The
generalization to many goods is trivial as long as expenditure shares for each good are independent of
the tariﬀ e.g., Cobb-Douglas preferences. To derive equation (9), start with equation (10) in Krishna:
τ iUS∂miUS/∂τ iUS+τ iROW∂miROW /∂τ iUS where all variables relate to 1988. Since τ iUS = τ iROW in 1988,
this expression can be re-written as τ iUSmiUS+miROW [θiUS∂ lnmiUS/∂τ iUS + (1− θiUS)∂ lnmiROW /∂τ iUS ]
where θiUS ≡ miUS/(miUS + miROW ) = 0.8 is the U.S. import share. In examining equation (9) em-
pirically, I ignore the fact that Krishna’s miUS and miROW are compensated demands for imports.
22
imports from the rest of the world by 40 percent. I therefore set ∆ lnmi1ROW/∆τ i1US equal
to +0.40.
Plugging −0.54 and +0.40 into equation (9) yields −0.8× (−0.54)− 0.2× (0.40) = 0.35
(t = 3.62). Since this number is statistically greater than zero, Krishna’s (2003) welfare
condition is satisfied. This conclusion is robust to the many alternative specifications of
tables 1-2. Thus, FTA trade creation dominated FTA trade diversion enough to ensure that
the FTA improved aggregate welfare.
7.2. Prices
A preferential trading agreement will not likely be welfare improving if it raises prices
(Panagariya 2000). Clearly the FTA is unlikely to have raised import prices — this would
require either some unusual change in the strategic interactions between firms or a rise
in tariﬀs against non-FTA trading partners. More likely the FTA reduced import prices
by allowing U.S. producers to send larger quantities per shipment, thus spreading fixed
shipping costs over a larger number of units. Fixed costs of shipping are suﬃciently large
that reducing them has been a key focus of Canadian public policy.14 Surprisingly, there
exists very little econometric work on the eﬀects of trade liberalization on import prices.
Huber (1971) is a rare exception.
To investigate, I examine the relationship between tariﬀ cuts and changes in import unit
values. Both these variables are available at the 10-digit Harmonized System (HS10) level.
While unit values are diﬃcult to interpret as prices, the hope is that at this detailed level of
disaggregation, changes in unit values over the FTA period reflect changes in prices. Note
14See the C.D. Howe Border Papers series for reviews of the public policy discussions.
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that I am looking only at unit-value changes within an HS10 item. This is very diﬀerent
from and less problematic than the typical use made of unit values. Typically, researchers
draw conclusions from the fact that one HS10 item has a higher unit value level than another
e.g., Schott (2001). Since unit values are based on actual payments net of import duties,
freight, insurance, and other charges, I will interpret changes in unit values as changes in
producer prices.
Canadian trade data was first collected in the HS system is 1988.15 Let ∆τ i1j be the
FTA period change in Canada’s tariﬀ against country j for HS10 product i. Let ∆ ln pi1j
be the corresponding log import price change. Since I do not have pre-FTA data on import
price changes at the HS10 level (∆ ln pi0j), I cannot estimate my standard equation (6)
with ∆ ln pi1US −∆ ln pi0US as the dependent variable. However, if the FTA had never been
implemented one expects ∆ ln pi1US to have evolved in the same way that Canada’s import
prices from other advanced economies evolved. I thus estimate
∆ ln pi1US −∆ ln pi1OECD = α+ βCA(∆τ i1US −∆τ i1OECD) + εi (10)
where ∆ ln pi1OECD is the simple average of the ∆ ln pi1j for the United Kingdom, Germany,
France, and Japan. Likewise for ∆τ i1OECD.
The third block of results in table 3 reports the estimates. The OLS estimate indicates
that the FTA did not raise import prices (bβCA = −0.004). There is modest evidence of
endogeneity at the 3 percent level and the IV estimates indicate that the FTA reduced
15In matching 1988 data with 1996 data I loose 33 percent of the 1988 HS10 items. There is some evidence
that the loss is non-random in that the average tariﬀ on the unmatched commodities is 0.5 percentage points
lower than on the matched commodities. This reflects the fact that many of the unmatched commodities
are in high-tech industries. For example, Intel’s introduction of the 486 CPU in 1989 quickly led to the
demise of the 386 CPU. (Don’t date yourself by admitting you remember this!)
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import prices by 7 percent for the most-impacted import-competing products.
One wonders if the HS10 import price changes are so noisy that these results are mean-
ingless. Import prices are defined as import values divided by import quantities so that any
noisiness in prices must come from noisiness in quantities. To investigate the role of noise,
I re-estimated equation (10) using log import quantity changes as the dependent variable.
The fourth block of results in table 3 reports the results. The FTA raised import quantities
by 70 percent. The t-statistics are huge and the exogeneity of tariﬀs is strongly rejected just
as in Trefler (1993). Thus, noise does not appear to be a problem.
To summarize, two conditions increase the likelihood that a preferential trade arrange-
ment is welfare improving: trade creation must dominate trade diversion and import prices
must not rise. Both of these condition are met in the FTA context.
8. Employment of Production and Non-Production Workers
I am now in a position to quickly review the results for other outcomes. The data distinguish
between workers employed in manufacturing activities and non-manufacturing activities. I
will refer to these as production and non-production workers since the distinction broadly
follows that used in the U.S. ASM. In particular, non-production workers are more educated
and better paid. The top block of results in table 4 reports a limited number of specifi-
cations for the employment of production workers. My baseline industry- and plant-level
specifications appear in rows 1 and 10, respectively. (Row numbers match those of table 1 so
that the reader can always remind herself of the specification details of any row by referring
back to the detailed discussion surrounding table 1.) The results indicate that the Canadian
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tariﬀ concessions reduced employment by a large amount, 14 percent using industry-level
estimates (t = −2.44) and 9 percent using plant-level estimates (t = −2.58). The eﬀects
of the U.S. tariﬀ concessions are less clear. They reduced employment by 7 percent using
industry-level estimates, but this is not statistically significant and virtually disappears in
the plant-level estimates. The total FTA impact of 8 percent (industry-level) and 4 percent
(plant level) are both economically large and statistically significant.
Rows 5, 6, and 12 present alternative specifications. In rows 5 and 6 the business
conditions control and the U.S. control are excluded, respectively. This does not aﬀect the
bβCA or bβUS. In row 12, the industry-level IV results are reported. Endogeneity is rejected
(p = 0.99). I do not report the plant-level IV results because endogeneity is always strongly
rejected at the plant level.
In contrast to the results for production workers, non-production worker employment is
estimated to have been unaﬀected by the U.S. tariﬀ concessions.
Finally, the ‘Skill Upgrading’ block of results in table 4 show that there has been FTA-
induced skill upgrading i.e., an increase in the ratio of non-production workers to production
workers. This happened at the industry level much more than at the plant level which
means that market shares have shifted in favour of non-production-worker-intensive plants.
Possibly these workers are a fixed cost that is needed to penetrate U.S. markets.
9. Earnings
Most commentators expected Canadian wages to fall in response to competition from less-
unionized, less-educated workers in the southern United States. Table 5 revisits this question
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using payroll statistics. Since the industry-level results are robust and since endogeneity is
strongly rejected, I do not report the specifications that appeared as rows 5, 6, and 12 of
tables 4. For all workers, the tariﬀ concessions raised annual earnings. For example, the total
FTA impact is a rise of 3 percent at both the industry level (t = 3.80) and the plant level
(t = 5.64). At the plant level, earnings rose for both production and non-production workers.
At the industry level, earnings gains were concentrated among production workers.16 I have
refined this observation by looking at hourly wages and hours worked by production workers.
As shown in table 5, there are wage eﬀects and no hours eﬀects. These earnings and wage
eﬀects are large in a statistical sense, but small in an economic sense. For example, a 3
percent rise in earnings spread over 8 years will buy you more than a cup of coﬀee, but not
at Starbucks. The important finding is not that earnings went up, but that earnings did
not go down in response to competitive pressures from the U.S. South.
There are a number of reasons why earnings may have risen slightly at a time when
employment was falling. First, there may have been end-game bargaining on the part of
unions seeking to extract rents from nearly-bankrupt firms as in Lawrence and Lawrence
(1985). To investigate, I use the Canadian Labour Force Survey which reports unionization
rates in 1996 for a classification in which manufacturing is divided up into 16 industries. The
correlation of Canadian tariﬀ concessions with union membership rates and union coverage
rates is 0.016 and 0.002, respectively. Thus, unionization does not oﬀer an explanation of
modestly rising earnings.
16My earnings results contrast sharply with those of Gaston and Trefler (1997) and Beaulieu (2000).
Gaston and Trefler found no statistically significant eﬀect of the tariﬀ concessions on earnings. The only
eﬀect Beaulieu finds is the positive eﬀect of U.S. tariﬀ concessions on non-production worker earnings (an
eﬀect I find only in the plant-level data, not the industry-level data). Once again, my improved data and
methodology means that my results supersede older results.
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Another possibility is that workers in the most impacted industries upgraded their skills,
possibly through the attrition of less-skilled workers. The Labour Force Survey is the most
detailed source of data on education by industry. It reports education on a consistent basis
back to 1988 (but not 1980). The correlation of Canadian tariﬀ concessions ∆τCAi1 with
1988-96 log changes in average years of schooling is -0.28 which supports the view that the
tariﬀ cuts were associated with educational upgrading. However, this correlation is almost
completely driven by the Clothing industry. The correlation falls to -0.06 when Clothing
is omitted. Note of course that the Clothing industry is too important for an analysis of
the FTA to simply be dismissed as an outlier. Thus, while there is some evidence that the
earnings eﬀect is driven in part by educational upgrading, this conclusion must be tentative.
The explanation of modestly rising earnings best supported by the data is seniority-based
worker attrition. The Labour Force Survey reports current job tenure over the 1980-1996
period. Let ∆ lnTenureis be the average annual log change in tenure in the pre-FTA pe-
riod (s = 0) or FTA period (s = 1). Figure 3 plots ∆ lnTenurei1 −∆ lnTenurei0 against
∆τCAi1 −∆τCAi0 . That is, it has the form of my usual diﬀerence-of-diﬀerences estimator. As is
apparent, industries that experienced the deepest tariﬀ cuts (and hence the deepest employ-
ment losses) also experienced the largest increases in current job tenure. The correlation is
−0.45.
The wage results point to a potential caveat for the labour productivity results. The 5
percent earnings rise associated with the Canadian tariﬀ concessions may in part reflect a rise
in labour quality. At one extreme, if the earnings rise was entirely due to increased labour
quality then labour productivity rose not by 15 percent, but by 15− 5 = 10 percent. This
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translates into a compound annual growth rate of 1.2 percent, still an enormous number.
At the other extreme, if productivity increases drove wage increases (i.e., if there was no
labour quality increase), then no correction to the productivity numbers is needed.
There is a presumption in the popular press that anything to do with globalization will
worsen income inequality. It is thus reassuring that there is absolutely no evidence that the
FTA worsened income inequality. In the last block of results in table 5, where inequality
is measured as the earnings of non-production workers relative to production workers, bβCA
and bβUS are eﬀectively 0.
10. What Underlies Rising Labour Productivity?
To the extent that the labour productivity benefits of the FTA reflect gains in technical
eﬃciency (as opposed to allocative eﬃciency), it is of interest to know how this came about.
This section examines three possibilities.
First, plants may have moved down their average cost curves. To examine this I estimated
my industry-level equation (6) for average output per plant and my plant-level equation (7)
for plant output. The results appear at the bottom of table 3 above. The industry-level bβCA
and bβUS are comparable in magnitude to those estimated by Head and Ries (1999b) though
my significance level is much lower.17 Their finding of statistical significance may reflect their
decision to work with annual changes without correcting for serial correlation. The more
interesting results are at the plant level since these are more readily interpretable as moving
along an average cost curve. The results indicate that the Canadian tariﬀ concessions led
17Head and Ries find bβCA = −0.11 with t = 3.08 and bβUS = .06 with t = 2.74. (For comparability, I
have scaled their estimates.)
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the most-impacted, import-competing plants to contract by 5 percent (t = 1.36) while the
U.S. tariﬀ concessions led the most-impacted, export-oriented plants to expand by 6 percent
(t = 2.01). These are not statistically significant results. Thus, this is not strong evidence
in support of a simple scale eﬀects explanation of labour productivity gains.
Second, the popular press reports that U.S.-owned multinationals have been reorga-
nizing their Canadian plants in order to produce fewer product lines, each with a global
mandate. This is consistent with Baldwin and Beckstead (2001) who find that for foreign-
owned plants operating in Canada, increases in exports are associated with reductions in
the number of commodities produced. Thus, plant rationalization may have contributed to
rising productivity.
Third, it is possible that my FTA-induced labour productivity gains do not extend to
TFP gains. However, this seems unlikely since there is little evidence of capital deepen-
ing, more intensive use of intermediate inputs, or rising mark-ups. Specifically, using my
diﬀerence-of-diﬀerences methodology, Trefler (2001) finds (1) no evidence of capital deepen-
ing at the 3-digit SIC level (capital stock is not available at the 4-digit level), (2) evidence
of only very modest increases in the usage of intermediate inputs at the 4-digit SIC level,
and (3) no evidence of increased mark-ups (not a surprise given that the most-impacted
import-competing industries are low-end manufacturing industries with low mark-ups to
begin with). Thus, the Hall (1988) TFP calculation shows that TFP must have risen sub-
stantially. More exactly, Trefler (2001) argues that the FTA-induced TFP changes are
roughly half of the labour productivity changes. That is, the TFP changes are huge.
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11. Conclusions
There are many ways in which the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement provides a unique
window onto the eﬀects of freer trade. The FTA was a relatively clean policy experiment,
untainted by macro shocks or financial crises. It was an agreement between two industri-
alized countries. It was a reciprocal agreement, which means it eﬀected exporters, not just
importers. In contrast, most previous studies of trade liberalization have dealt with the uni-
lateral trade actions of a developing country. Several strong conclusions emerged from the
analysis. First, the FTA was associated with substantial employment losses: 12 percent for
the most-impacted, import competing group of industries and 5 percent for manufacturing
as a whole. These eﬀects appear in both the industry- and plant-level analyses. Second, the
FTA led to large labour productivity gains. For the most-impacted, export-oriented group of
industries, labour productivity rose by 14 percent at the plant level. For the most-impacted,
import-competing group of industries, labour productivity rose by 15 percent with at least
half of this coming from the exit and/or contraction of low-productivity plants. For manu-
facturing as a whole, labour productivity rose by about 6 percent which is remarkable given
that much of manufacturing was duty free before implementation of the FTA. Third, the
FTA created more trade than it diverted and possibly lowered import prices. Thus, the
FTA likely raised aggregate welfare.
The FTA is the well spring of one of the most heated political debates in Canada.
This heat is generated by the conflict between those who bore the short run adjustment
costs (displaced workers and stakeholders of closed plants) and those who are garnering the
long run gains (stakeholders of eﬃcient plants, consumers, and purchasers of intermediate
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inputs). One cannot understand current debates about freer trade without understanding
this conflict. Unfortunately, much of the academic debate has been fragmented: one set
of researchers has focussed on the short-run adjustment costs of worker displacement while
another has focussed on the long-run productivity gains. While this paper does not provide
the silver bullet that makes the case either for or against free trade, I believe that it has
considerably refined the question. My hope is that the results here take us one step closer
to understanding how freer trade can be implemented in an industrialized economy in a
way that recognizes both the long-run gains and the short-run adjustment costs borne by
workers and others.
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Appendix
A. Tariﬀ Details
The Canadian tariﬀ data were supplied by Statistics Canada at the 4-digit SIC level. The
U.S. tariﬀ data were constructed as follows. The 1980-88 data were converted from the
TSUSA classification system (approximately 10,000 products) to SITC(revision 2) (approx-
imately 800 products) using Feenstra’s (1996) converter. It was then converted to Canadian
SIC (213 industries) using a converter supplied by Statistics Canada. This converter was
largely unique, but where not, weights for pro-rating data across SIC industries were supplied
by Statistics Canada. For 1989-94 tariﬀ rates, the same procedure was followed, but start-
ing from HS10 rather than TSUSA. For 1996 data, I converted the Census Bureau’s ‘U.S.
Imports of Merchandise: December 1996’ (CD-96-12) data from HS10 to SITC(revision 3)
using the supplied converter. I then converted the data to SITC(revision 2) using an almost
1:1 converter supplied by Feenstra (1996) and proceeded as with the 1980-88 data.
Of Canada’s 225 4-digit SIC industries, 4 were excluded from the analysis because of
incomplete data and another 16 were aggregated into 8 categories in order to ensure consis-
tency of the trade and tariﬀ data over time. The aggregated industries are: 1094 and 1099;
1511 and 1599; 1995 and 1999; 2911 and 2919; 2951 and 2959; 3051 and 3059; 3351 and
3359; 3362 and 3369.
The tariﬀ data are defined as duties divided by imports. These data are collected at the
tariﬀ-line level (e.g., HS10 after 1988). I have compared a large number of the tariﬀ rates
so derived with published statutory tariﬀ rates. The two tariﬀ rate series are the same. A
key issue is how to aggregate the tariﬀ-line data up to the 4-digit SIC level. Since imports
are the only data reported at a comparable level of disaggregation, I must follow what all
empirical trade researchers do and aggregate using import weights. This is accomplished
in the usual way as follows. Consider a single 4-digit SIC industry, let i be an HS10 item
feeding into the industry, let I be the set of HS10 items feeding into the industry, let τ it be
the tariﬀ rate and let mit be the share of the industry’s imports accounted for by product i.
My tariﬀ rate changes have the form ∆τ ≡ Σi²Iτ itmit−Σi²Iτ i,t−1mi,t−1. For later reference,
∆τ = Σi²I(τ it − τ i,t−1)mit − Σi²I(mit −mi,t−1)τ i,t−1.
Ideally I would prefer to use fixed-weight tariﬀs ∆τ fixed = Σi²I(τ it − τ i,t−1)mi,t−1. How-
ever this can not be calculated because about one third of all 1988 HS10 items disappeared
by 1996. (Companies often hire lawyers to have their HS10 reallocated to a higher tar-
iﬀ HS10.) To get a handle on the diﬀerence between ∆τ fixed and ∆τ , I manipulated the
estimates of ∆τ fixed that were used by the Government of Canada in its pre-FTA assess-
ment of the likely impacts of the agreement (Magun et al. 1988). To understand what
I did note that most industries had their tariﬀs reduced to 0 linearly either over 5 years
or 10 years. Using Magun et al. (1988) I classified 4-digit SIC industries into either the
5- or 10-year category. (The Magun et al. study reported estimates of ∆τ fixed using an
input-output table classification that breaks manufacturing into about 60 industries.) In
the formula ∆τ fixed = Σi²I(τ i,1996 − τ i,1988)mi,1988 I set τ i,1996 = 0 for 5-year industries and
τ i,1996 = 0.20τ i,1988 for 10-year industries. This allows me to compute ∆τ fixed.
The outcome of this procedure is estimates of∆τCA,fixedi1 and∆τUS,fixedi1 where I am using
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the notation of equation (2). Across 4-digit SIC industries the correlation of ∆τCA,fixedi1 with
∆τCAi1 is 0.98 and the correlation of ∆τ
US,fixed
i1 with ∆τUSi1 is 0.97. That is, my tariﬀ rate
changes are very similar to a best estimate of fixed-weight tariﬀ changes. Not surprisingly,
the two tariﬀ-change series yield almost identical results for estimates of βCA and βUS.
Trefler (2001, appendix 2) discusses further aspects of aggregation.
Table A1 reports ∆τCAi1 and ∆τUSi1 for the most-impacted, import-competing industries.
B. Scaling βCA and βUS and Defining ‘Total FTA Impact’
Recall that Yi,1988 is the level of, say employment, in industry i in 1988. The industry i
change in employment over the FTA period is approximately 8 (∆yi1)Yi,1988 i.e., the log
change times the initial level. Multiplying by 8 converts the average annual changes for the
8 FTA years into a total FTA period change. The change in employment among industries
in any set I is approximately 8
P
i²I (∆yi1)Yi,1988. As a proportion of total employment it
is 8
P
i∈I ∆yi1ωi where ωi ≡ Yi,1988/
P
j∈I Yj,1988.18 Using the fact that 8 d∆yi1 = 8bβk∆τki1
(k = CA,US) is the predicted impact of country k’s tariﬀ concessions in industry i, the
predicted tariﬀ-induced log change in employment is 8
P
i∈I
bβk∆τki1ωi where I is the set of
industries in the most-impacted, import-competing industries (k = CA) or export-oriented
industries (k = US). Defining ∆τk·1 ≡ 8Σi∈I∆τki1ωi, the predicted impact reduces to bβk∆τk·1
which is what is reported in the tables.
C. Estimation of ∆bis
As noted in section 4, construction of ∆bis requires the preliminary step of estimating
∆1yit = θi + ΣJj=0θij∆1zt−j + ηit.
I use OLS since my only criterion is to minimize in-sample prediction error. This regression
was estimated separately for each industry using 1983-96 data. (As discussed in footnote
??, I do not have data for 1981 and 1982.) This leaves only 13 observations for estimating 7
parameters. (θi0, θi1, and θi2 are each tuples.) To modestly increase the degrees of freedom,
I estimated the regression at the 3-digit SIC industry level rather than at the 4-digit SIC
industry level. There is not much diﬀerence between the 3- and 4-digit ∆bis as can be seen
from the fact that on average there are only 2.03 4-digit industries per 3-digit industry.
Since ∆bis is a generated regressor, I re-estimated all my results for the case where
∆bi1 − ∆bi0 is an endogenous regressor in equations (6) and (7). This had no impact on
the results. Further tests of mis-specification due to a generated regressor led to rejection
of mis-specification.
18There are some exceptions to this definition of ωi. For the cases of production worker earnings and
wages, ωi is based on total hours worked by production workers. For the cases of skill upgrading and
inequality ωi is based on total employment. For intra-industry trade, ωi is based on Canadian imports from
the United States. Otherwise, if Yi,1988 is a ratio then ωi is based on the numerator of the ratio i.e., if
Yi,1988 = ai,1988/bi,1988 then ωi ≡ ai,1988/
P
j∈I aj,1988.
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Appendix table A2 reports results for diﬀerent choices of years. As is apparent, the
results do not change substantially as long as the FTA baseline year is 1988. A referee has
suggested that I also report results for the periods 1981-88 and 1989-96. Since the worst
of the FTA adjustment happened immediately, the use of 1989 as the FTA baseline period
means that I miss at least some of the adjustment. Indeed, the estimated coeﬃcients are
somewhat smaller.
D. Measuring Labour Productivity
Table A3 reports the results for labour productivity using 3 alternative measures of labour
productivity. The most commonly used measure of labour productivity at the industry level
is value added per worker deflated by an output deflator. This is the third measure reported
in table A3. There are several defects with this measure, two of which are easily addressed.
The first deals with the measurement of labour input. In Canada, but not in the United
States, there has been a strong trend towards part-time employment. By not correcting for
Canadian hours, measure 3 has a downward trend. Since this trend will be spuriously cor-
related with the downward trend in tariﬀs, the estimated eﬀect of the FTA on productivity
(bβCA and bβUS ) will be downward biased. The Canadian data allow for an hours correction.
Unlike the U.S. data, value added is reported for production activities alone and thus can be
directly compared with the data reported for hours worked. Measure 1 of table A3 reports
the estimates using Canadian real value added in production activities per hour worked and
U.S. real value added in all activities per employee. This is the same measure used in table
2. As expected, the estimates tend to be larger for measure 1 than for measure 3 (though
both are large). Clearly, measure 1 is preferred.
The second data issue deals with deflators. In table A3, measures 1 and 3 use output
deflators while measure 2 uses value-added deflators. Value-added deflators would have been
preferable had the U.S. deflator not been seriously flawed for present purposes. It is at the
2-digit level (20 industries) and even at this highly aggregated level there are imputations
for instruments (SIC 38) and electric and electronic equipment (SIC 36). Measure 2 of table
A3, the value added-deflated measure, thus has serious problems. This said, the (bβCA, bβUS)
based on value-added deflators are very similar to the (bβCA, bβUS) based on output deflators.
This can be seen by comparing measures 1 and 2 in table A3. See Trefler (2001, appendix
4) for a detailed discussion of deflators.
E. Plant Selection Issues
As noted in section 2.5, my results apply to long-form plants that were in existence in 1980,
1986, 1988, and 1996. These tend to be large plants. For example, in 1988 the average long-
form plant was 2.2 times larger than the all-plant average. Note that the average long-form
continuing plant was only 2.1 times larger than the all-continuing-plant average so that the
large size of my plants is due to the fact that they are long-form rather than continuing per
se.
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The available evidence suggests that long-form selection issues are of secondary impor-
tance in the current context. To see this, I begin by noting that almost every plant in
Canada receives either a long-form or short-form survey so that almost the entire universe
of Canadian plants are surveyed. Next, for the few industry outcomes available in the
short-form survey (employment, earnings, output, and a measure of labour productivity),
the estimates of βCA and βUS based on long-form and on long-form plus short-form plants
are very similar. The exception is the estimate of βUS for employment. It implies employ-
ment losses of −4 percent using the long-form plants and −6.7 percent using long—form plus
short-form plants. Thus, the conclusions from the long-form continuing plants appear to be
broadly representative of all continuing plants.
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Figure 1.  Canadian and U.S. Bilateral Tariffs in Manufacturing
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Table 1. Detailed Results for Employment
Canadian 
Tariffs ∆τCA
U.S. Tariffs 
∆τUS
Business 
Conditions ∆b
U.S. Control 
∆y US
Total FTA 
Impact
βCA t   βUS t δ t γ t TFI t
Industry Level, OLS
1 gdp, rer  (2) -.12 -2.35 -.03 -0.67 .29 6.96 .15 2.21 .24 -.05 -2.66
2 gdp, rer  (0) -.11 -2.03 -.04 -0.91 .30 3.66 .21 2.75 .12 -.06 -2.58
3 gdp (2) -.11 -2.08 -.03 -0.66 .37 6.60 .15 2.16 .23 -.05 -2.41
4e  -- -.14 -2.40 -.02 -0.52 .20 2.58 .07 -.06 -2.58
5e gdp, rer  (2) -.13 -2.48 -.02 -0.39 .28 6.74 .29 3.00 .24 -.05 -1.71
6 gdp, rer  (2) -.14 -2.75 -.03 -0.80 .30 7.12 .23 -.06 -3.16
7e  -- -.17 -2.88 -.03 -0.66 .04 -.07 -3.15
8e gdp, rer  (2) -.14 -2.24 -.02 -0.53 .29 6.89 .15 2.11 .24 -.06 -2.65
9e gdp, rer  (2) -.12 -2.30 -.06 -1.45 .30 7.23 .14 2.04 .27 -.06 -3.24
Plant Level, OLS
gdp, rer  (2) -.12 -3.76 .00 0.15 .13 4.59 .25 5.29 .04 -.04 -3.26
gdp, rer  (2) -.12 -3.60 -.01 -0.26 .16 5.63 .25 5.21 .02 -.04 -3.51
Industry Level, IV
gdp, rer  (2) -.24 -1.45 .09 0.66 .29 6.68 .15 2.06 .22 .60 / .65 -.04 -1.26
gdp, rer  (2) -.24 -1.43 .04 0.29 .31 6.37 -.16 -0.50 .20 .67 / .57 -.05 -1.57
Plant Level, IV
gdp, rer  (2) -.19 -2.40 .07 0.94 .13 4.30 .24 4.96 .04 .14 / .99 -.04 -2.55
gdp, rer  (2) -.19 -2.44 .07 0.92 .13 4.17 .16 0.95 .03 .10 / .89 -.04 -3.10
Notes :
a )
b )
c )
d )
e )
Adj. 
R 2
OverId / 
Hausman
The 'OverId/Hausman' column reports p -values for the over-identification and Hausman tests.  Rejection of the instrument set or exogeneity are indicated by p -values less than 0.01.
11e
12e
13e
14e
Construction 
of ∆b
The number of observations is 213 for the industry-level regressions and  3,801 for the plant-level regressions.
In rows 4 and 7, the business conditions variable is omitted so that business conditions are controlled for implicitly by double-differencing ∆y i 1−∆y i 0. In row 5 the U.S. control is
replaced by the Japan-U.K. control discussed in the text. In row 8, the 2 'outlier' observations with the largest Canadian tariff cuts are omitted. In row 9, all 9 observations associated with
the automotive sector are omitted. In row 11, the plant controls are omitted. In rows 12 and 14, only the Canadian and U.S. tariff variables are endogenized. In rows 13 and 15, the two
tariff variables and the U.S. control are endogenized.
15e
The dependent variable is the log of employment. The estimating equation is equation (6) for the industry-level regressions and equation (7) for the plant-level regressions. 
βCA is scaled so that it gives the log-point impact of the Canadian tariff concessions on employment in the most-impacted, import-competing industries. βUS is scaled so that it gives the
log-point impact of the U.S. tariff concessions on employment in the most-impacted, export-oriented industries. The 'Total FTA Impact' column gives the joint impact of the tariff
concessions on employment in all 213 industries.
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Table 2. Detailed Results for Labour Productivity
Canadian 
Tariffs ∆τCA
U.S. Tariffs 
∆τUS
Business 
Conditions ∆b
U.S. Control 
∆y US
Total FTA 
Impact
βCA t   βUS t δ t γ t TFI t
Industry Level, OLS
1 gdp, rer  (2) .15 3.11 .04 1.14 .25 8.30 .16 1.99 .31 .058 3.79
2 gdp, rer  (0) .15 2.77 .02 0.40 .13 1.79 .28 3.05 .09 .050 2.87
3 gdp (2) .17 3.21 .04 1.17 .25 5.19 .21 2.43 .18 .065 3.87
4b  -- .16 2.85 .01 0.34 .29 3.23 .08 .051 2.89
5b .14 2.79 .05 1.36 .26 8.77 .05 0.31 .29 .058 2.46
6 gdp, rer  (2) .14 2.96 .05 1.44 .27 8.82 .30 .059 3.89
7b  -- .15 2.58 .03 0.76 .04 .053 2.98
8b gdp, rer  (2) .17 2.97 .04 0.98 .26 8.34 .16 1.95 .30 .061 3.76
9b gdp, rer  (2) .16 3.27 .02 0.49 .26 8.61 .18 2.24 .33 .051 3.36
Plant Level, OLS
gdp, rer  (2) .08 1.70 .14 3.97 .12 3.95 .11 1.51 .06 .074 4.92
gdp, rer  (2) .09 1.92 .11 3.02 .10 3.18 .14 1.79 .01 .066 4.39
Industry Level, IV
gdp, rer  (2) .15 1.10 .10 0.86 .26 8.09 .14 1.53 .30 .86 / .43 .081 3.41
gdp, rer  (2) .13 0.89 .13 1.01 .28 6.99 -.08 -0.28 .28 .87 / .51 .083 3.40
Plant Level, IV
gdp, rer  (2) .22 1.67 .05 0.49 .11 3.20 .17 1.80 .06 .06 / .77 .082 2.53
gdp, rer  (2) .79 2.58 -.49 -1.73 -.19 -1.29 2.07 2.29 .05 .76 / .52 .050 0.39
Notes :
a )
b )
Construction 
of ∆b
13b
11b
12b
10
Adj. 
R 2
OverId / 
Hausman
15b
The dependent variable is the log of labour productivity. The estimating equation is equation (6) for the industry-level regressions and equation (7) for the plant-level regressions. The
number of observations is 211 for the industry-level regressions and 3,726 for the plant-level regressions.  See the notes to table 1 for additional details.
14b
In rows 4 and 7, the business conditions variable is omitted so that business conditions are controlled for implicitly by double-differencing ∆y i 1−∆y i 0. In row 5 the U.S. control is
replaced by the Japan-U.K. control discussed in the text. In row 8, the 2 'outlier' observations with the largest Canadian tariff cuts are omitted. In row 9, all 9 observations associated
with the automotive sector are omitted. In row 11, the plant controls are omitted. In rows 12 and 14, only the Canadian and U.S. tariff variables are endogenized. In rows 13 and 15,
the two tariff variables and the U.S. control are endogenized.
Table 3. Trade Diversion/Creation, Import Prices, and Output
Canadian 
Tariffs
U.S.         
Tariffs
Total FTA 
Impact
Business 
Conditions
Variable
  
βCA      t   βUS       t TFI      t      δ
Canadian Imports from the U.S.
OLS Industry .54 -4.67 .16 -2.16 .01 .83 .22 *c .24 211
IV Industry 2.32 .80 -.86 -.40 -.15 -.48 .30 .15 NA / .28 211
Canadian Imports from the Rest of the World
OLS Industry -.40 2.67 .08 -.17 .03 .12 .11 * .05 211
IV Industry -1.60 -.54 1.24 .48 .22 .47 .08 .04 NA / .75 211
Canadian Import Prices
OLS Product -.004 .20 .00 4,700
IV Product -.073 2.26 .00 .51 / .03 4,700
Canadian Import Quantities
OLS Product .70 15.12 .05 4,700
IV Product 1.02 12.68 .04 .87 / .00 4,700
Gross Output Per Plant in Production Activities
OLS Industry -.05 -.65 .03 .54 .00 -.05 .30 * .18 211
IV Plant -.05 -1.36 .06 2.01 .01 .72 .16 * .05 3,751
Notes :
a )
b )
c )
d )
βCA  and βUS  are scaled as described in the notes to table 1.
An asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
The 'OverId/Hausman' column reports p -values for the over-identification and Hausman tests. Rejection of the instrument
set or exogeneity are indicated by p -values of less than 0.01. Blank entries indicate OLS estimation. The instrument set
varies across specifications according to results of the over-identification tests. The industry-level import results use wages
and employment and so are just identified (NA). The product-level import results use wages, employment, squares, and cross-
products. The output results use wages, employment, imports, exports, squares, and cross-products.
OverId / 
Hausmand
Observa-
tions
Adj. 
R 2
The dependent variable is indicated in bold font at the start of each block of results e.g., 'Canadian Imports from the U.S.'
All dependent variables are in logs. The estimating equation is equation (6) for the industry-level regressions, equation (7)
for the plant-level regressions, and equation (10) for the product-level regressions. The business conditions variable is the
same as in the table 1, row 1 baseline specification. The U.S. control is not included either because it is inappropriate (the
trade equations) or because the published data on the number of plants are only available at 5-year intervals (the output per
plant equations).
Table 4. Employment and Skill Upgrading
Canadian 
Tariffs
U.S.         
Tariffs
Total FTA 
Impact
Business 
Conditions
U.S. 
Control
Variable
  
βCA     t   βUS     t    TFI      t         δ      γ
Employment - Production Workers
1 Industry -.14 -2.44 -.07 -1.56 -.08 -3.44 .37 *b .16  .33
5 Industry -.13 -1.99 -.07 -1.36 -.08 -2.89 .21  .07
6 Industry -.16 -2.93 -.08 -1.71 -.09 -4.08 .37 *  .32
12 Industry -.20 -1.28 .03 .17 -.06 -1.60 .37 * .16  .32 .62 / .99
10 Plant -.09 -2.58 -.03 -.87 -.04 -3.01 .17 * .29 *b .04
Employment - Non-Production Workers
1 Industry -.06 -.71 .05 .79 .00 .02 .36 * .07  .26
5 Industry -.07 -.77 .05 .73 .00 -.09 .14  .00
6 Industry -.06 -.79 .04 .71 .00 -.12 .36 *  .26
12 Industry .01 .06 .11 .52 .05 1.22 .36 * .11  .25 .19 / .85
10 Plant -.14 -3.02 .04 1.19 -.03 -1.72 .02 .15 .01
Skill Upgradingc
1 Industry .11 1.41 .10 1.67 .08 2.72 .47 * .24  .48
5 Industry .08 .79 .11 1.26 .07 1.81 .24  .01
6 Industry .12 1.63 .10 1.56 .08 2.82 .47 *  .48
12 Industry .11 .50 .15 .74 .10 2.21 .47 * .25  .48 .12 / .99
10 Plant -.01 -.30 .04 1.48 .01 .96 .05 * .17 .01
Notes :
a )
b )
c )
d )
Adj. 
R 2
OverId / 
Hausman
The dependent variable is indicated in bold font at the start of each block of results e.g., 'Employment - Production Workers.' The
estimating equation is equation (6) for the industry-level regressions and equation (7) for the plant-level regressions. Row numbers
correspond to those in table 1 so that the reader can refer to table 1 for details of the specification. Rows 1 and 10 are my baseline
specifications.  See notes to table 1 for further details, including the scaling of the βCA  and βUS .
All dependent variables are in logs. The number of observations in the industry-level (plant-level) regressions is 211 (3,742) for
production workers, 212 (3,539) for non-production workers, and 211 (3,489) for skill upgrading.
An asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
Skill upgrading is the log of the ratio of non-production workers to production workers.
Table 5. Earnings, Wages, Hours, and Inequality
Canadian 
Tariffs
U.S.         
Tariffs
Total FTA 
Impact
Business 
Conditions
U.S. 
Control
Variable
  
βCA      t   βUS       t TFI      t      δ      γ
Earnings - All Workers
1 Industry .05 2.43 .03 1.92 .03 3.80 .34 *b .25 *b .20
10 Plant .04 2.92 .04 3.60 .03 5.64 .17 * .19 * .03
Earnings - Production Workers
1 Industry .04 2.12 .00 -.02 .02 3.61 .16 * .11  .07
10 Plant .05 3.25 .03 2.57 .03 4.74 .12 .21 .02
Earnings - Non-Production Workers
1 Industry .01 .30 -.01 -.29 .00 .02 .18 * .12  .08
10 Plant .04 1.48 .06 2.87 .03 3.67 .11 .11 .01
Hourly Wages of Production Workers
1 Industry .05 3.15 .03 1.84 .03 4.37 .60 * .13  .33
10 Plant .06 3.23 .02 1.40 .03 4.04 .20 .16 * .01
Annual Hours of Production Workers
1 Industry -.01 -.48 -.02 -1.75 -.01 -1.94 .02 .14  .01
10 Plant -.02 -.90 .01 .80 .00 -.12 .03 .07 .00
Earnings Inequalityc
1 Industry -.04 -1.32 -.01 -.55 -.02 -1.66 .42 * .05  .21
10 Plant -.01 -.46 .02 .97 .00 .41 .13 * .08 .00
Notes :
a )
b )
c )
d )
Earnings inequality is the ratio of non-production-worker earnings to production-workers earnings.
All dependent variables are in logs. The number of observations in the industry-level (plant-level) regressions is
213 (3,801) for the earnings of all workers, 211 (3,742) for the earnings of production workers, 212 (3,526) for the
earnings of non-production workers, 211 (3,489) for earnings inequality, 211 (3,738) for wages, and 211 (3,738)
for hours.
Adj. 
R 2
The dependent variable is indicated in bold font at the start of each block of results e.g., 'Earnings - All Workers.'
The estimating equation is equation (6) for the industry-level regressions and equation (7) for the plant-level
regressions. Row numbers correspond to those in table 1 so that the reader can refer to table 1 for details of the
specification. Rows 1 and 10 are my baseline specifications. See notes to table 1 for further details, including the
scaling of the βCA  and βUS .
An asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
Table A1. The 71 Most-Impacted, Import-Competing Industries
SIC INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION    ∆τi 1CA     ∆τi 1US SIC INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION    ∆τi 1CA     ∆τi 1US
1131 Brewery Products Industry -.331 -.012 3612 Lubricating Oil And Grease Industry -.079 -.004
3271 Shipbuilding And Repair Industry -.241 -.012 2641 Metal Office Furniture Industry -.079 -.001
1931 Canvas And Related Products Industry -.183 -.008 2811 Business Forms Printing Industry -.078 -.016
2433 Men's and Boy's Pants Industry -.170 -.053 * 1921 Carpet, Mat And Rug Industry -.078 -.021
2443 Women's Dress Industry -.162 -.076 * 1083 Sugar And Chocolate Confectionery Industry -.077 -.024
2491 Sweater Industry -.159 -.125 * 3751 Paint And Varnish Industry -.073 -.036 *
2451 Children's Clothing Industry -.159 -.031 * 2542 Wooden Kitchen Cabinet And Bathroom Vanity Ind. -.073 -.002
2441 Women's Coat and Jacket Industry -.157 -.049 * 1141 Wine Industry -.071 -.030 *
1993 Household Products Of Textile Materials -.156 -.017 3771 Toilet Preparations Industry -.070 -.024
2442 Women's Sportswear Industry -.154 -.053 * 3993 Floor Tile, Linoleum And Coated Fabrics Inds. -.070 -.045 *
2494 Hosiery Industry -.152 -.040 * 2721 Asphalt Roofing Industry -.069 -.044 *
1911 Natural Fibres Processing And Felt Processing -.150 -.041 * 3791 Printing Ink Industry -.069 -.017
2434 Men's and Boy's Shirt and Underwear Industry -.147 -.072 * 2492 Occupational Clothing Industry -.066 -.031 *
2432 Men's and Boy's Suit and Jacket Industry -.147 -.065 * 3542 Structural Concrete Products Industry -.066 -.015
2431 Men's and Boy's Coat Industry -.143 -.079 * 3021 Metal Tanks (Heavy Gauge) Industry -.066 -.011
2493 Glove Industry -.140 -.020 3029 Other Fabricated Structural Metal Products Inds. -.065 -.033 *
2496 Foundation Garment Industry -.137 -.029 * 3931 Sporting Goods Industry -.065 -.010
1712 Footwear Industry -.127 -.082 * 1821 Wool Yarn And Woven Cloth Industry -.061 .004
2612 Upholstered Household Furniture Industry -.112 -.001 2733 Paper Bag Industry -.061 -.042 *
1998 Tire Cord Fabric Industry & Other Textiles Products -.108 -.047 * 3243 Non-Commercial Trailer Industry -.060 .009
2611 Wooden Household Furniture Industry -.106 -.002 1621 Plastic Pipe And Pipe Fittings Industry -.058 -.031 *
2499 Other Clothing And Apparel Industries -.103 -.040 * 3311 Small Electrical Appliance Industry -.058 -.024
2581 Coffin And Casket Industry -.101 -.004 1051 Cereal Grain Flour Industry -.057 -.008
2495 Fur Goods Industry -.097 -.053 * 3032 Prefabricated Portable Metal Buildings Industry -.057 .000
2444 Women's Blouse and Shirt Industry -.094 -.104 * 2941 Iron Foundries -.057 -.002
2649 Other Office Furniture Industries -.090 -.002 1093 Potato Chip, Pretzel And Popcorn Industry -.056 .017
1041 Fluid Milk Industry -.089 -.006 3991 Broom, Brush And Mop Industry -.055 -.040 *
1991 Narrow Fabric Industry -.089 -.002 2792 Stationery Paper Products Industry -.054 -.013
2619 Other Household Furniture Industries -.089 -.012 1052 Prepared Flour Mixes And Prepared Cereal Foods -.054 -.021
3761 Soap And Cleaning Compounds Industry -.088 -.032 * 2819 Other Commercial Printing Industries -.052 -.003
1829 Other Spun Yarn And Woven Cloth Industries -.088 -.081 * 2799 Other Converted Paper Products Industries -.051 -.013
3242 Commercial Trailer Industry -.087 -.004 3031 Metal Door And Window Industry -.051 -.032 *
3792 Adhesives Industry -.084 -.025 * 2821 Platemaking Typesetting And Bindery Industry -.051 -.012
1713 Luggage, Purse And Handbag Industry -.082 -.073 * 1012 Poutry Products Industry -.051 -.017
2543 Wooden Door And Window Industry -.079 -.039 * 3594 Non-Metallic Mineral Insulating Materials Inds. -.049 -.058 *
1691 Plastic Bag Industry -.079 -.023
Notes : This table reports 1988-96 changes in tariff concessions for those industries in the most-impacted, import-competing group. An asterisk
indicates that  the industry is also in the most-impacted, export-oriented group of industries.
Table A2. Different Choices of pre-FTA and FTA Periods
Canadian 
Tariffs ∆τCA
U.S. Tariffs 
∆τUS
Variable
      
βCA    t      βUS      t
Employment, OLS
1980-86, 1988-96 -0.12 -2.35 -0.03 -0.67
1980-88, 1988-96 -0.09 -2.03 0.00 0.04
1980-86, 1988-94 -0.13 -2.35 0.00 0.02
1981-88, 1989-96 -0.10 -2.05 0.01 0.14
Productivity, OLS
1980-86, 1988-96 0.15 3.11 0.04 1.14
1980-88, 1988-96 0.15 3.35 0.00 0.04
1980-86, 1988-94 0.17 2.74 0.01 0.20
1981-88, 1989-96 0.12 2.64 -0.04 -1.03
Notes:
a ) The dependent variable is given in bold. The estimating equation is
equation (6). All rows correspond to the table 1, row 1 baseline
specification except in the choice of years used for the difference of
differences.
Table A3. Sensitivity to Different Definitions of Labour Productivity
Canadian 
Tariffs
U.S.         
Tariffs
Total FTA 
Impact
Business 
Conditions
U.S. 
Control  
βCA      t   βUS       t TFI      t      δ      γ
1. Labour Productivity - Production Activities - Hours Adjusted - Output Deflators
1 Industry .15 3.11 .04 1.14 .06 3.79 .25 *b .16  .31
10 Plant .08 1.70 .14 3.97 .07 4.92 .12 * .00 .06
2. Labour Productivity - Production Activities - Hours Adjusted - Value-Added  Deflators
1 Industry .17 2.96 .03 .67 .06 3.26 .19 * .13  .16
10 Plant .10 2.06 .16 4.58 .09 5.69 .07 .20 *b .07
3. Labour Productivity - All Activities - Not Hours Adjusted - Output Deflators
1 Industry .11 2.27 -.03 -.93 .02 1.29 .20 * .24 * .19
10 Plant .09 2.19 .13 4.07 .07 5.54 .11 * .13 .09
Notes :
a )
b )
c )
Adj. 
R 2
All dependent variables are in logs. The number of observations in the industry-level (plant-level) regressions is
211 (3,726) for measures 1 and 2 and 213 (3,801) for measure 3.
The dependent variable is indicated in bold font at the start of each block of results. The estimating equation is
equation (6) for the industry-level regressions and equation (7) for the plant-level regressions. Rows 1 and 10 are
my baseline specifications as in table 1. See the notes to table 1 for further details, including the scaling of the βCA 
and βUS .  All estimates are OLS.
An asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
